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Despite reputedly widespread market manipulation and insider trading, we find surprisingly 
high liquidity and low transactions costs for actively traded securities on the NYSE between 
1890 and 1910, decades before SEC regulation.  Moreover, market makers behave largely as 
predicted in theory:  stocks with liquid markets and competitive market makers (cross-trading at 
the rival Consolidated Exchange) trade with substantially lower quoted bid-ask spreads and with 
less anti-competitive behavior (price discreteness).  Effective spreads, illiquidity, and volume all 
improve monotonically over time.  Notably, the asymmetric information component of effective 
spreads increases in relative and absolute terms from 1900 to 1910.    
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Financial crises nearly always generate increased government involvement in the regulation of 
financial markets and institutions.   The collapse of financial markets and myriad banks between 
1929 and 1933, followed as it was by a slew of new federal regulation, remains the most 
significant example of the crisis-response pattern in the United States.  While most would agree 
that resulting institutions like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have provided 
useful oversight and regulatory functions over the past 70 plus years, we actually know very little 
about the functioning of US financial markets prior to the onset of government regulation.   
Thus, in this paper, we examine liquidity provision and transactions costs—key 
parameters of market performance—in the New York Stock Exchange between 1890 and 1910.  
Using a newly-gathered database of daily closing prices, quoted bid and ask prices and trading 
volume for all stocks traded on the exchange in those years, we calculate various measures of 
illiquidity and transactions costs, in order to estimate the quoted and effective costs of trading.  
In order to understand the sources of trading costs and market liquidity, we decompose the 
effective spread measures into asymmetric information and order-processing components, based 
on theoretical models of spread components.  We then analyze the cross-sectional determinants 
of the quoted spreads and market liquidity, including the impact of simultaneous trading on the 
main competing exchange, the Consolidated Exchange.   
Given the relatively early phase of development of equity trading in the NYSE, along 
with the rudimentary communications technology of the pre-WWI era, we expect to find high 
spreads by modern U.S. standards. Moreover, given the absence of regulation regarding insider 
trading, one might be tempted to expect a relatively high adverse selection component in quoted   3
spreads and illiquid trading.  At the same time, however, we expect that parallel trade on the 
Consolidated likely increased competition (even if it also decreased efficiency via market 
fragmentation) and therefore tightened spreads on the NYSE, particularly for stocks traded on 
both.  
  In fact, some of our hypotheses are borne out by the data, but there are many surprises.  
Indeed, for the most heavily traded stocks, trading costs are roughly comparable to those in 
developed markets at the end of the century. So we definitely have to revise our expectation that 
markets operated with dramatically higher trading costs at this time. Likewise we find that 
measures of market illiquidity for the highest volume stocks are comparable to the same measure 
for stocks traded at the NYSE at the end of the 20
th century.    In the cross sectional analysis, we 
confirm our hypothesis that stocks with liquid markets—those with a high number of trading 
days and large volume—trade at lower cost, and those with simultaneous Consolidated activity 
trade with significantly lower spreads.  Over time, however, quoted spreads do not behave in line 
with other measures of market liquidity and trading costs:  while quoted spreads increase from 
1900 to 1910, effective transaction costs and market illiquidity decrease monotonically and 
trading volume of common stocks increases monotonically from 1890 to 1910.  Preferred shares 
show a different volume pattern, with the more actively traded shares increasing in volume from 
1890 to 1900 and then dropping off again by 1910.  Also of note, the asymmetric information 
component of trading costs increases in relative and absolute terms from 1900 to 1910. 
This study contributes to a growing line of research into the microstructure and 
performance of securities markets prior to government regulation.  Few other works have 
investigated the historical development of transactions costs and liquidity in U.S. markets, 
particularly the NYSE.  To our knowledge, the current paper is the first to study these 
phenomena for the NYSE using high-frequency historical data.  Most closely related to our work 
is Jones (2002), which examines month-end quoted bid-ask spreads for the components of the   4
Dow Jones Industrial average between 1900 and 2000. Jones (2002) shows that transaction 
costs—he considers bid-ask spreads and commissions—explain a small part of the equity 
premium over this long period. Also, spreads seem to be good predictors for future returns.  The 
purpose of that study is to follow very long-run movements in transactions costs.  Due to the 
lower frequency of the data and the smaller sample (of mostly the largest firms), the results 
cannot readily be compared with those presented in the current paper.  Moreover, our results 
suggest that quoted bid-ask spreads are not a good measure for comparing the relevant 
transaction costs over time. Rather measures of effective transaction costs or market illiquidity 
are more reliable. 
Also related to our work, Brown et al. (forthcoming) argue that direct competition with 
the Consolidated Stock Exchange between 1885 and 1926 reduced transaction costs at the 
NYSE. While they identify the competition effect around structural breaks in the time domain, 
our cross-sectional regressions measure the competitive impact of firms being traded both at the 
NYSE and the Consolidated Stock Exchange. In this sense we can also measure the value of a 
“cross-listing” on both exchanges.  As with Jones (2002), Brown et al. (forthcoming) rely on one 
trading day per year over an extended period for a small sample of stocks, as opposed to our 
daily data on the complete set of traded stocks.  Additionally, we find that price clustering at 
whole and half dollar increments – a potential indication for non-competitive conduct – is less 
pronounced for securities traded on both exchanges both in 1900 and 1910.   
Davis et al. (2007), focusing on capacity constraints and their softening after the seat sale 
of 1928, also produce quoted bid-ask spreads for a selected high and low volume days 
surrounding the sale.  Mean spreads range from .65 to 1.69 percent:  far lower than the estimates 
we produce for the full set of stocks traded in 1900/1910 but similar to the spreads on high 
volume stocks in these years.  Their cross-sectional results, however, produce similar predictive   5
factors as we find for the earlier period.  Their study also has data insufficient to create the more 
extensive measures of effective transactions costs and market illiquidity that we use.    
More similar from a methodological standpoint, Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) study trading 
costs in the Berlin Stock Exchange, using daily prices, for a similar time period (1880-1910).  
Due to the nature of trading in that market, however, the data are also quite different from the 
NYSE data:  the Berlin market produced only one daily price quote and no reported bid-ask 
spreads.  The results of that study indicate that estimated effective spreads in Berlin ranged 
between approximately 11 and 28 basis points, while round-trip transactions costs varied from 45 
to 116 basis points.  In both cases, the measures declined over time, but unlike the New York 
Exchange they were already fairly low by historical standards and certainly a lot lower than the 
average at the New York Stock Exchange at that time. 
These findings are particularly interesting in comparison with recent developing markets 
(Lesmond, 2005).  Our estimates indicate that NYSE illiquidity at the turn of the 20
th century 
was roughly comparable to emerging stock markets of China, the Czech Republic and Mexico at 
the end of the 20
th century. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  the next section reviews the historical 
context of the New York Stock Exchange and key features of corporate finance practice in the 
pre-World War I era.  Section III describes the theoretical underpinnings of various measures of 
transactions costs, while section IV introduces the newly created database on daily stock prices, 
volumes, and spreads.  Section V presents the quoted and estimated effective spreads and their 
decompositions, and section VI investigates the cross-sectional determinants of quoted spreads.  
The final section concludes. 
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II. The Development of the NYSE before World War I 
 
The New York Stock Exchange was created in 1792 when twenty four brokers and merchants 
signed the Buttonwood Agreement.  At this time, five securities were traded on the exchange 
(nyse.com).
4  In the first half of the nineteenth century, government issues comprised the bulk of 
publicly traded securities.  By 1860, the liberalization of incorporation law (Hickson and Turner, 
2005) allowed for the creation of marketable securities to trade on organized exchanges.  Within 
a few years, railroads began issuing securities for trading on the large public markets in order to 
satisfy their growing demands for capital.  Around the 1880s, rail stocks made up a substantial 
majority of the trading on the NYSE.  Listings and trading on the exchange grew rapidly, and the 
mix of securities changed, in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth.  While railroad securities remained important, they lost some market share around the 
turn of the twentieth century, as other sectors expanded more rapidly.
5  By 1910, “non-rails” 
outnumbered railroads on the NYSE for the first time since 1870 (Davis and Cull 1994).  The 
value of securities listed on the exchange exceeded $26 billion (about $500 billion in 2005 
terms).
6   
 
Rules and Regulation:  
In the period of our study, the NYSE was owned by its members and largely self-regulated.  
Among the key regulations were those dealing with membership.  Joining the exchange was a 
costly venture: a new member had to pay a membership fee and then buy the seat of an existing 
                                                 
4 See Michie (1986), p. 173 and Mulherin et al. (1991), p. 597, for surveys of the institutional development of the 
NYSE.  See also Baskin (1988). 
5 Navin and Sears (1955) consider the 1880s the beginning of the shift to the widely-held industrial enterprise, 
particularly due to the “trust” movement in the processing industries.  The main trusts created in the 1880s involved 
oil refining (Standard Oil), cotton oil refining, linseed oil refining, whiskey distilling, sugar refining, and lead 
smelting and refining.  They also credit the heavy demand for trading in trust certificates with New York’s rise to 
preeminent exchange during the late 1880s. 
6 Davis and Neal (1998) report a figure of 5.4 billion pounds, based on Michie (1987).  The dollar values come from 
using the calculator provided by www.measuringworth.com.   7
member.  The exchange had fixed the number of seats at 1,100 in 1879, so that the prices of seats 
varied with the market.  These prices ranged between $4,000 and $4,500 in 1870 (approximately 
$65,000 in 2005 values) and between $64,000 and $94,000 in 1910 (roughly $1-2 million in 
2005 values).
7     
The Governing Committee of the exchange held ultimate responsibility for exchange 
operations and had the power to fine or even expel members for infractions against exchange 
rules.  The value of a member’s seat worked as collateral in these cases or in the event of 
bankruptcy (Mulherin et al., 1991, 597-598).  The courts upheld these powers as well as the 
exchanges’ right to restrict trading solely to its members and to set other rules (Mulherin et al., 
1991, 598-602). 
The NYSE implemented relatively stringent listing standards and requirements, including 
registration of all shares (to prevent stock watering), minimum shareholder numbers, and 
qualitative assessment of risk.  Oil stocks, for example, could not be listed in their early years, as 
they were deemed too risky. 
External regulation of exchange operations or of listed corporations came much later, and 
corporate reporting law generally remained weak in the United States up until the Great 
Depression.  Private incentives, particularly the desire to access outside funds from investors, 
encouraged more and more firms to disclose their balance sheets and income statements.  In 
1895, the NYSE began recommending that listed companies provide both a balance sheet and an 
income statement in annual reports to investors.  Such reporting became mandatory in 1899 
(nyse.com).
8  The content of these reports varied significantly in their breadth and accuracy, and 
accounting standards and auditing practices took many more decades to evolve into what would 
become the modern norm.   
                                                 
7 Michie (1986, p. 175), presumably reported in nominal terms. 
8 See as well Archambault and Archambault (2005), who find that even as of 1915, listed companies—particularly 
industrials that were not already regulated by the government—were significantly more likely to report an income 
statement than unlisted companies.  Similarly, listed companies were far more likely to report a balance sheet.   8
 
Organization of trading: 
Though it started out operations using a call auction system, the NYSE moved to a continuous 
auction method in 1871.
9  Under this system, transactions occurred throughout the trading day at 
whatever terms could be agreed upon by the parties involved, with no guarantee of a single 
price.
10  While the continuous auction method eliminated the problem of overcrowding and the 
excessive time taken in the call auction, it created new problems of order imbalance—the 
brokers interested in trading a given security may not arrive simultaneously at the particular 
trading post for that security.  In general, such random arrival reduces market liquidity, creating 
greater order imbalance and price volatility compared to a call auction (Kregel, 1995). 
The evolution of the trading method led to the creation of two distinct types of 
intermediaries.  The first type, brokers, traded on behalf of their customers and received set 
commissions as their payment.  The others, jobbers, bought and sold shares in order to make 
markets in securities, and they received the spread between bid and ask prices as their 
compensation.  The increasing number and sophistication of jobbers then encouraged their 
specialization in particular stocks, hence the term ‘specialist.’  These specialists made a market 
in their stocks at a single trading post, and they traded on their own account as well as on behalf 
of their customers.   
 
Competition from other Exchanges: 
The NYSE’s restrictive membership and listing rules led to the repeated rise of competitors from 
its inception.
11  The most significant competition came with the creation of the Consolidated 
                                                 
9 Kregel (1995, p. 464) gives a number of reasons relating to inefficiencies of the call auction.  Kregel finds 
unconvincing Garbade and Silber’s (1979) explanation for the shift to continuous trading—that the Civil War 
increased the arrival of new information to the market. 
10 See Kregel (1995) on the evolution of securities market organization in London and New York. 
11 See, for example, Garvey (1944).   9
Stock Exchange, formed out of the merger of several rival exchanges, in 1885.    The 
Consolidated included 2,403 members—more than double the number of NYSE members—and 
many brokers also traded in the unorganized “curb” market.  By 1908, the three exchanges 
contained 424 million shares of stock, over half of which (53.5 percent) were traded outside of 
the NYSE (Michie, 1986, 175-176). 
Compounding the incentives to deal outside of the NYSE, the brokers of the New York 
Stock Exchange charged a fixed minimum commission of 1/8 percent on trades.
12  The 
Consolidated Stock Exchange, by contrast, charged a commission rate of 1/16, thus encouraging 
nonmembers of the NYSE to deal on the Consolidated using NYSE market prices (Michie, 1986, 
p. 178).  By using the NYSE quotes, brokers of the Consolidated Exchange saved on the costs of 
creating a price discovery mechanism, and were thereby able to charge lower commissions than 
the NYSE (Mulherin et al., 1991, 608).  
The NYSE worked continuously but not altogether successfully to eliminate its 
competition.  It created an Unlisted Trading Department to trade in stocks of the Consolidated 
(Mulherin et al., 1991, 609), tried to remove tickers from the Consolidated Stock Exchange and 
from outside brokers, and later forbade phone links to the Consolidated Stock Exchange.  The 
latter efforts failed, however, because brokers with legitimate access to the NYSE would trade at 
the Consolidated at NYSE prices (Michie, 1986, 178).
13   In 1896, dealing in differences between 
domestic exchanges was banned and in 1898 the exchange banned the transmission of 
continuous price quotes (Michie, 1986, 179).   
The anti-competitive measures proved difficult to enforce, but they still limited 
transactions between the NYSE and other domestic exchanges and created price differentials.  
                                                 
12 A loophole in the rule, however, allowed commissions of 1/32 percent (and often as low as 1/50 percent) on trades 
for members buying and selling from each other.  This discount pertained to all partners of a member firm, and thus 
fostered the growth of large brokerage firms (Michie, 1986, 177-178).  The original Buttonwood agreement stated a 
minimum commission of ¼ percent. 
13 For a detailed description of the legal battle for exchanges to control their quotes see Mulherin et al., 1991   10
The restrictive rules of the NYSE therefore limited the market in some securities, but 
simultaneously hindered access to current prices by traders in the Consolidated.  As Michie 
(1986) points out, the “New York Stock Exchange covered only part of the New York market 
and prevented the remainder from operating as efficiently as possible.”  
 
Transactions Costs: Information and Competition 
Trading in securities brought with it numerous costs, relating to both information asymmetries 
and order processing.  Information discrepancies between insiders and outsiders raised costs that 
could be only partially offset by corporate reporting.  The use of continuous trading created 
additional illiquidity risk, particularly in stocks with thin markets that often required specialists 
to hold inventories in order to make deals.  Specialists required compensation for bearing these 
risks, and the resulting spreads added to overall transactions costs.  Moreover, restricted 
memberships, minimum commission rates for brokers, and specialization in securities 
(effectively product differentiation) may have lessened competition and allowed some market 
power in the setting of spreads by specialists. 
On the positive side, the innovations of the telegraph, ticker, and telephone lowered the 
costs associated with disseminating information and expanded the NYSE’s geographical reach 
(Mulherin et al., 1991, 606).  It also allowed competing markets to gain access to NYSE quotes 
and facilitated competition between the NYSE and other exchanges.  These effects should have 
helped lower order processing costs.  To the extent that the exchange limited the listing of issues 
judged to be too risky, the resulting selection bias should have mitigated the asymmetric 
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III. Measuring Market Liquidity and Transactions Costs  
 
The development of the microstructure of the New York Stock Exchange prior to World War I 
provides a unique real world experiment on the evolution of trading systems and associated 
market liquidity and transactions costs in an unregulated (or self-regulated) environment.  
Trading costs further reflect information about information asymmetries and market power.  
Together, these various measures, and their underlying explanatory factors, provide a wide-
ranging picture of market functioning.   
It is useful first to differentiate quoted spreads from effective spreads. While quoted 
spreads can be readily observed as raw data, effective spreads need to be estimated by statistical 
methods.  Typically, effective spreads are more informative about real trading costs, because 
quoted prices often change soon after a transaction has taken place or because traders can 
actually negotiate to trade at prices between the quotes. When quotes change frequently during 
the day, the effective costs of a round-trip transaction is likely to be lower than the quoted spread 
at any point in time, because a hypothetical trader could take advantage of the option value of 
trading the second part of a round-trip transaction at a different more favorable points in time 
later. Also price improvements in form of bilateral agreements between traders and market 
makers are rather customary in so-called quote drive trading systems, (i.e. in trading systems 
based on market makers.) 
Depending on the availability of empirical observations, estimated spreads can be 
decomposed into the various theoretical components, like information, inventory holding, and 
order processing cost. Since this decomposition of the underlying cost components is largely 
based on theoretical considerations, in the sequel we briefly outline the theoretical basis for the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
   12
Quoted spreads 
Market makers in an asset market receive as their compensation the difference between the price 
paid to sellers and the price obtained from buyers—the bid-ask spread.  Empirically, the 
difference between quoted ask and bid prices, normalized by the midpoint of bid and ask prices 
of the asset, provides an estimate of the actual transaction cost. Transactions do not necessarily 
take place at quoted bid and ask prices, however, meaning that quoted spreads are not necessarily 
precise reflections of real transactions costs.  Moreover, the quoted spread wraps up a range of 
different transactions costs: order processing expenses, inventory risk, asymmetric information, 
and potentially monopoly rents.    A number of alternative methods have been devised to more 
accurately depict transactions costs and to allow decomposition of the spread into various 
components. 
  
Realized Spreads and their Components 
In order to estimate realized spreads, we use the method proposed by George et al. (1991). This 
method refines and extends the serial covariance measure proposed by Roll (1984).  In that 
approach, for 1 it it it rpp − =−  denoting the transactions return on a security i in period t, where  it p  
is the natural logarithm of the price of stock i, the Roll measure  () 1 , cov 2 − − = it it
R
i r r s  is an 
estimate of security i’s effective spread.
14  Since trades often take place at prices between the 
quoted bid and ask prices, the estimated effective spread is smaller than a quoted spread.  The 
underlying idea of this estimator is that, in informationally efficient and stationary markets, 
variation in transactions prices results from the randomness of buy and sell orders plus positive 
transaction costs. In liquid markets with low transaction costs, successive individual orders have 
little impact on observed transaction prices. In thin markets, price effects of individual trades 
                                                 
14  The transactions return is based on observed transactions prices. Transactions returns typically differ from true 
returns, because even in efficient markets transactions costs prevent arbitrage, when true returns and transactions 
returns are close enough.    13
may be more pronounced. If transaction costs are higher, the deviation of transaction prices from 
true fundamentals will not be immediately arbitraged, even in efficient markets. Therefore, the 
covariance of successive price changes provides information about market liquidity, and hence, 
effective transaction costs.
15 In liquid markets the covariance of successive prices will be low as 
long as the price changes are not caused by systematic factors such as new market information. 
And even new information will be reflected in prices immediately. In less liquid markets the 
covariance will be higher, both, because of a larger market impact of individual trades, and 
because information revelation is slower.  The effective spread therefore arguably offers a better 
estimate of actual transaction costs than does the quoted spread. 
The GKN measure corrects for positive autocorrelation in the expected returns, thereby 
overcoming the problem that the Roll measure often produces negative spread estimates.  In the 





p mq π =+   ,     (1) 
where  it m  is the logarithm of the true value of the asset at time t, π is the proportion of the quoted 
spread that is due to order-processing costs,  i s  is the quoted spread and  it q  is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the transaction at time t is at the ask price and -1 if the transaction is at 
the bid price. The true value of asset i consists of the expected return prior to transaction t, the 
asymmetric information component, which reflects information revealed by transaction t, and a 





bmπ =−   .     (2) 
Subtracting the bid price from the transaction price and taking the first difference yields 
11 1 () ( )
2
d i
it it it it it it it
s
rp bpb q q π − −− =− − − = −  .     (3) 
                                                 
15  See Madhavan (2000) for a more technical survey on the empirical estimation of transaction costs.   14
Note that equation (3) does not depend on the true value  it m  and hence any time series properties 
that the expected return  1 it it mm − −  may exhibit do not influence 
d
it r . Taking the autocovariance 
of 
d
it r  yields the spread measure 
1 2c o v ( ,)
GKN d d
ii t i t i s rr s π − =− = .      (4) 
Using the spread measure 
GKN
i s  one can infer the proportion of the order processing component 
π by a cross-section regression of  i s  on 
GKN
i s : 
01
GKN
ii i ss β βε = ++   .     (5) 
According to equation (4) we expect  0 ˆ 0 β =  and  1 ˆ β π = . 
Since we do not have bid and ask quotes for the year 1890 to correct for the positive 
autocorrelation in expected returns we also employ another measure proposed by George et al. 
(1991). For this measure the returns of closing prices,  it r , are regressed on the expected return on 
the equal weighted market index  1 (| )
m
tt E rI − :  
01 1 (| )
m
it t t it rE r I γ γη − = ++  
Then the Roll measure is applied to the residuals of this regression: 
2
1 2c o v ( , )
GKN
ii t i t s ηη − =− . 
 
Market Liquidity 
Closely related to the cost of trading is the concept of market liquidity. While the spread itself is 
a widely used measure of market liquidity, it cannot reflect quantity reactions to changes in 
prices or spreads.  Characterizing market liquidity in this manner requires alternative measures, 
three of which can be calculated with our historical data:  i) the number of trade observations, ii)   15
the trading volume, and iii) the Amihud illiquidity measure.
16  Asset pricing models have found 
the Amihud measure particularly useful (e.g. Amihud, 2002, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Pastor 
and Stambaugh, 2003). 
  The Amihud stock illiquidity measure can be defined as the average ratio of the daily 










Aill , where T  
defines the averaging period (either monthly or annual).  Economically, the illiquidity measure 
can be interpreted as the daily price impact caused by the respective order flow.  
 
IV. Data  
 
We test our hypotheses on liquidity, transactions costs, and spread components, using a new 
database containing the transaction data for all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
and reported in the New York Times for every trading day (Monday through Saturday) in the 
years 1890, 1900, and 1910.  We gathered all data reported daily, including closing transaction 
prices, closing quoted bid and ask prices (only available in 1900 and 1910), and the number of 
shares sold for each stock each day.
17     
The original New York Times reports contained some errors.  For some observations, 
errors were easily apparent, and we corrected them.  For others, however, it was not as clear-cut. 
In these cases we adopted the following procedure: whenever the distance of a particular 
observation to the mean of the series exceeded eight times the standard deviation, we treated the 
entry as an erroneous datapoint (or at least an extreme outlier observation) and consequently 
deleted it.   
                                                 
16 For a more extensive discussion of alternative measures of liquidity see Amihud (2002). 
17 The exchange operated every day but Sunday up until 1952, when the Saturday sessions ended.  We also collected 
the closing price and days’ volume for 1890, but because the NYT did not publish quoted bid and ask prices at that 
time, we cannot calculate quoted spreads or conduct the spread decomposition for 1890.   16
Comparing the data over the three points in time (Table 1), it is clear that the total 
number of traded NYSE securities changes only slightly over time, but the number of companies 
traded on the NSYE did change considerably from one decade to the next.  The number of 
companies actually dropped between 1890 and 1900, from 231 to 190, before rebounding 
slightly to 200 in 1910.
18  While on the face of it, we might expect more shares to enter trading 
over time, the introduction of listing requirements in 1895/1896, particularly the obligation to 
publish annual reports made formal in 1899, likely depressed numbers.  In addition, the crisis of 
1893, the drying up of the new issues market from 1893 to 1897, and the beginnings of the 
merger wave in 1895, meant the exit of some existing companies and entry of fewer new ones.  
Due to an increase in issuance of preferred stocks, however, the number of securities (as opposed 
to companies) listed in the New York Times remained quite constant: 326 in 1890, 307 in 1900 
and 332 in 1910.  Between 1890 and 1900, preferred shares increased as a proportion of total 
listings from 23% to 35% and over the following ten years, their proportion relative to common 
stocks remained constant.  Of these 1910 listings, only 185 (56%) were already traded in 1900, 
which also means that about 40 percent of the 1900 listings left the NYSE listings by 1910.   
  By certain measures, shares traded more actively over time, particularly in the early part 
of the period.  For example, the average (median) number of trading days rose from 81 (31) per 
company in 1890 to 127 (96) in 1900.  That number then fell back slightly to 117 (90) in 1910.  
The number of companies with at least 90 trading days followed a similar pattern, increasing 
from 110 in 1890 to 159 in 1900, and then rose slightly to 166 in 1910.  While only 77 firms 
traded at least 150 days in 1890, 127 firms did so ten years later (down slightly to 124 firms in 
1910). 
                                                 
18 These figures are approximate, because the New York Times may have varied its reporting practices over time 
and (to a lesser extent) because we may have missed some firms that changed name or for which the New York 
Times changed its abbreviation of the name, and we failed to spot it.  The abbreviations varied considerably, but we 
cleaned the data for this problem as best as possible.   17
Daily trading volumes follow a different pattern:  the median number of shares traded 
dropped from 255 in 1890 to 83 in 1900 but then rebounded to 267 in 1910.  But since trading 
days increased so much between 1890 and 1900, the total trading volume (in $) over the course 
of the year still rose.  Based on averages, daily trading volume remained fairly constant at around 
2,000 shares per day. In 1910, the daily averages covered a wider range, but the number of days 
traded increased.  But while annual total shares increased significantly for 1910 median dollar 
volume fell.  Average dollar volume increased by about two-thirds.   
The high average volumes relative to medians come from a small number of heavy 
traders, such as Reading Railroad, which posted average sales of $14.6 million per day in 1910 
(Table 2).  The highest 20 trading volumes for each year reached well into the hundreds of 
millions annually, with daily averages ranging mostly between a half million and 1.5 million in 
1900.  The companies with the highest total trading volume change over the three years but three 
firms remained among the 20 most traded stocks in 1890, 1900 and 1910 (Union Pacific; 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe; and Northern Pacific).  One or two highly active shares exceed 
all others by a wide margin.  American Sugar Refining topped the list in both 1890 and 1900, 
with nearly $1.6 billion of shares traded over 287 trading days in the latter year.  The Reading 
held top place in 1910, with $4.3 billion of shares traded over 293 trading days.  The second and 
third most traded stocks in 1910, Union Pacific and U.S. Steel, came in slightly behind, at $3.6 
and $3.1 billion, respectively, over almost as many trading days.  Below that, however, the 
annual volume drops off rather quickly, so that the tenth highest volume is about $250 million in 
1910, for example.  While the enormous railroads clearly dominated the top twenty in dollar 
volume, a few of the industrials and utilities—sugar, copper, steel, telephone, and gas—were in 
the same league.   
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V. Overall Market Liquidity and Transactions Costs 
 
We add to this basic picture of market liquidity using quoted bid-ask spreads, a measure of the 
effective bid-ask spread (GKN) developed by George et al. (1991), and the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure. Given the lack of bid and ask quotes for 1890, quoted spreads and GKN can 
only be calculated for 1900 and 1910.  Therefore, we also calculate a second measure of the 
effective spread, proposed by George et al. (1991), that we denote as GKN2.   
A first look at the data presents a somewhat mixed and even contradictory picture. Based 
on the GKN2 measure, effective trading costs fell dramatically from a sample-wide average of 
3.8% in 1890 to 1.04% in 1900 and then further to 0.82% in 1910.  Similarly, market illiquidity 
fell markedly over the three points in time.  These patterns match well the path of increasing 
trading volume for common stocks but contradict the non-monotonic development of trading 
volume for preferred stocks.  Also, quoted bid-ask spreads increased throughout from 1900 to 
1910 for both common and preferred stocks alike. This is particularly true for mean spreads but 
also applies to median spreads. The average quoted spreads over the full sample as well as for 
most volume categories rose between 1900 and 1910, from about 2.4 percent in 1900 to almost 3 
percent in 1910.  Median spreads were significantly lower than averages but increased slightly 
for the full population, from 1.64 to 1.7 percent (Table 3).
19  
While improving communications technology could have lowered transactions costs, 
other factors seem to outweigh these potential cost reductions.  In fact, our finding squares with 
Garvy (1944) and Brown et al. (forthcoming) who claim that after 1909 competition from the 
Consolidated Exchange declined.  This loss of competitive pressure likely allowed brokers to 
raise costs.  The population of securities clearly changed somewhat over the interval of our 
                                                 
19 Note that Table 3 uses the average spread for each firm, thereby equally weighting all stocks.   This method gives 
higher means and medians, since they give as much weight to light traders (with higher spreads) as heavy traders 
(with lower spreads).    19
observations, and newer listings carried higher spreads.  Notably, however, the phenomenon of 
rising quoted spreads still appears among the subset of shares traded in both years (the average of 
which increased from 2 percent to 2.6 percent) and among the subset of shares traded on NYSE 
and the Consolidated (the average of which increased from 1.3 percent to 1.8 percent). 
Preferred shares differ substantially from common stock, particularly in the voting and 
dividend rights attached to them.  We may expect lower risk and therefore potentially narrower 
spreads on preferred shares. According to the GKN2 measure, in all three years preferred shares 
have lower effective spreads than common stocks although this difference is small in 1900.  It 
should be noted, however, that this measure of effective spreads is noisy, and therefore a more 
rigorous analysis is deferred to quoted spreads and George et al. (1991)’s other measure of 
effective spreads.  For 1900 we observe this phenomenon, with preferred shares averaging 
quoted spreads of a little more than 1.5 percent, while common stocks averaged nearly 2 percent 
(1.96)—a statistically very significant difference.
20  In 1910, however, the gap between common 
and preferred spreads disappeared almost entirely.   
As is often the case in more recent data, effective spreads are lower than quoted spreads 
on average in 1900, but the difference is fairly small (2.27 versus 2.42).
21  In 1910, the GKN 
measure actually exceeds the average quoted spread by a small margin (3.04 versus 2.99).  The 
estimates of the GKN spread (Table 3), like the quoted spreads, rose significantly between 1900 
and 1910—from an average of 2.28 percent in 1900 to an average of 3.04 percent in 1910.  As 
with the quoted spreads, the distribution of spreads is skewed, so that median effective spreads 
are lower, at 1.6 and 1.9, for the same years.  Effective spreads also grew on average for the full 
                                                 
20 Based on averages across the entire sample of spreads, rather than using the average within each stock, as reported 
in Table 3.   Averaging across averages for each stock, the spreads are about 1.8 and 2.8 for preferred and common, 
respectively. 
21 We calculate the GKN measure for all companies for which the serial covariance of the returns of the bid prices 
could be computed based on at least 4 observations, i.e. where the number of observations of the second order 
difference of bid prices is greater or equal to 4. This condition leaves us with 203 firms in 1900 and 182 in 1910.   20
sample.  As with quoted spreads, common stocks trade with higher effective spreads on average 
than do preferred shares (2.6 versus 1.8).    
While the hypothesized relationship between transactions costs and the liquidity of the 
market for a given company’s shares cannot be verified in the inter-temporal evolution of 
transactions prices, we check whether it is satisfied in the cross-section within a given year. 
Hence, we divide up the sample into thirds based on the average dollar volume of shares traded 
each day for the individual shares.  Spreads and other characteristics of the stocks differ 
substantially depending on the average daily dollar volume traded.  Those in the lowest volume 
tercile trade with the highest average spreads (both quoted and effective) and also have the 
lowest prices and highest return variance.  Effective spreads are actually higher than the quoted 
bid-ask spreads for the most actively traded stocks   A big portion of the increase in spreads 
between 1900 and 1910 shows up in the lowest volume tercile, where the GKN measure 
increased from an average (median) of 3.4 (2.8) to 4.6 (4.3).  Among the most actively traded 
stocks, the median GKN measure increases from 0.9 to 1.2 percent.  At the same time, the mean 
for this tercile rose from 1.3 to 1.8 percent.  In other words, in the annual cross-sections, 
transaction costs relate monotonically negatively with trading volume for both common and 
preferred stocks. 
The estimates for the actively traded stocks are comparable to recent estimates for the 
NYSE/AMEX exchanges. For example, Hasbrouck (2006) reports mean trading costs of about 1 
percent and a median of .54-.61 depending on the specific measure in use for daily data from 
1993-2005.  Our estimated effective spreads for 1900 and 1910 are well below Lesmond’s 
(2005) estimates for modern emerging markets. The 1890 estimates of the effective spread for 
high volume stocks of about 2.2% percent for the mean and 1.5% median are comparable to the 
estimates of the Roll measure for China (1991-2000), the Philippines (1987-2000), Portugal   21
(1988-2000) and Israel (1993-2000). This is another indication for the high degree of trading 
efficiency and liquidity in the early and unregulated New York Stock Exchange. 
The spread premium for common over preferred shares also shows up most among the 
lightest traders, for whom average GKN spreads are nearly twice as high for common stocks as 
for preferred stocks in 1900.  In fact, the reverse is true among the most active traders—common 
stocks trade at similar or even lower average GKN spreads (1.3 versus 1.7 in 1900); though 
medians are nearly identical.    
  In historical comparison the evolution of the Amihud illiquidity measure may be of 
particular interest. This measure decreased dramatically from a level of 19.8 in 1890 to 10.1 in 
1900 to 5.0 in 1910 for common stocks and 10.8 (1890), 2.2 (1900) to 2.5 (1910) for preferreds. 
The corresponding numbers in the high volume tercile of common stocks, however, are 
significantly lower: 0.49 in 1890, 0.34 in 1900, and 0.31 in 1910. Surprisingly, those numbers 
compare directly with corresponding measures of market illiquidity in  the most developed 
modern stock markets.  Amihud (2002), for example, reports a cross-sectional mean of 0.34 for 
NYSE stocks in 1963-1996.
22  Thus, the 50 or so highest volume securities at the beginning of 
the century traded with illiquidity or transactions costs comparable to the average NYSE trading 
costs at the end of the century.  Lesmond (2005) reports Amihud measures of 0.39 for China 
(1991-2000), 0.43 for the Czech Republic (1993-2000), and 0.46 for Mexico (1988-2000).  By 
these measures, the most active NYSE stocks at the turn of the century appear slightly less 
illiquid than these modern emerging markets. 
 
Spread components 
We can learn even more about the sources of transactions costs and illiquidity by decomposing 
the effective spreads into an order processing and asymmetric information components using a 
                                                 
22  Hasbrouck (2006) reports a mean of 0.36 (median of 0.07) on daily cross-sections AMEX/NYSE, 1993-2005.   22
cross section regression, based on equation (5).  We evaluate this equation separately for 
common and preferred stocks and also by high and low volume (Table 4).  For common stocks, 
we find that half of the effective spread comes from order processing costs in 1900, and that 
figure falls to about 17 percent in 1910.  On the flip side, therefore, the asymmetric information 
component rises from 50 percent in 1900 to 83 percent in 1910.  Even with the increase in dollar 
spreads between 1900 and 1910, the order processing component drops from about 44 cents to 
41 cents.  For preferred shares, we find an order processing component of 29 percent in 1900, 
and that figure jumps to 42 percent ten years later (in dollar terms, 33 to 74 cents).   These 
patterns fit with the changes in trading volume:  increasing for common stocks and decreasing 
for preferreds. 
The spread decomposition also differs depending on trading volume, particularly for 
1900.  For stocks in the top half of the volume range, the spread is due almost entirely to order-
processing costs.  The order-processing component of spreads of firms in the lower half of the 
trading volume range is 46 percent in 1900 and 22 percent in 1910.  The remainder, of course, is 
attributable to asymmetric information.  In other words, asymmetric information costs contribute 
essentially nothing to the spreads for heavily traded stocks in 1900, while such costs make up 
half of trading costs for lighter traders in the same year and 80 percent for both high and low 
volume stocks in 1910.   
This result contrasts with findings by George et al. (1991) and Stoll (1989) who find that 
although the size of the spread varies according to the liquidity of a stock, the composition of the 
spread does not. Since trading in stocks should have increasing returns to scale (e.g. due to fixed 
costs) we would expect a decrease not only in total spread but also in the order processing cost 
component as trading volume increases. However, the results show that asymmetric information 
costs essentially disappear as a component of transaction costs for highly traded stocks in 1900   23
but become much more important in 1910.  The fact that the order processing component 
increases with volume suggests that spreads contain monopoly rents in 1900. 
Also of note, the intercept in the estimation of equation (5) is positive.  While 0 ˆ β  is 
positive and significant in both years, the estimates vary considerably.  The generally positive 
constant implies that there is negative serial correlation in the adjusted returns even in the 
absence of a bid-ask spread. According to Harris (1990) this can be explained by price 
discreteness.  Since stock prices are expressed as multiples of a minimum tick size there are 
rounding errors that increase the negative serial correlation of returns. The minimum tick size on 
the NYSE in 1900 and 1910 was $1/8. Figure 1 shows the frequency of quotes on the eight 
possible $-fractions. Assuming that the true value of the stock is a continuous variable we would 
expect quote prices to be equally distributed among the eight fractions. Figure 1, however, shows 
that in both years more than one half of all quotes are integers and around 20 percent end on half 
fractions. With more than 70 percent of all quotes being multiples of one half, market makers are 
clearly not exploiting the full range of the price grid. This does indeed lead to considerable 
rounding errors and a positive intercept in the above regressions. 
Moreover, Christie and Schultz (1994) claim that avoiding odd eighth quotes is an 
indication for anticompetitive behavior on the part of the market makers. Following this 
interpretation we measure anti-competitiveness by the proportion of quotes that are multiples of 
one half. Table 5 reports the results of an OLS regression of this measure of anti-competitiveness 
on proxies for trading activity (volume and the number of trading days) and risk (variance and a 
dummy variable for preferred shares). In addition, we expect a positive relationship between the 
proportion of integer or half-integer quotes and the stock price since exploiting the full price grid 
is more important for reducing relative rounding errors on stocks with low prices. This effect is 
confirmed by our analysis; in both years, the coefficient of log(P) is highly significant and 
positive. But even after controlling for this effect, the proxies for trading activity are important;   24
both volume and the number of trading days relate negatively to price-discreteness.  Price 
discreteness also increases with risk:  Higher return variance significantly increases the mass on 
zero and one half price fractions in both years; and preferred shares, which are considered to be 
less risky than common shares, have a lower proportion of integer and half-integer quotes (the 
difference is significant for 1900).  In other words, anti-competitive behavior appears to be more 
prevalent for less actively traded and more risky stocks. Another interpretation for this finding is 
that market makers do not explicitly quantify their costs but rather use a rule of thumb according 
to which they respond to uncertainty by rounding to the next integer or half-dollar price.  We 
also find, however, that stocks cross-listed on the arch-rival Consolidated Exchange trade with 
significantly less price discreteness than those with NYSE-only trading.   This finding supports 
the interpretation of price discreteness as an indicator of anti-competitive behavior. 
 
VI. Explaining Transactions Costs and Market Liquidity 
 
Spreads and liquidity measures vary considerably among stocks at any point in time, and the 
characteristics of securities, and of the trading process for them, may influence these costs.  
Thus, we also examine the cross sectional determinants of spreads and of the Amihud measure.   
 
Factors Influencing Spreads (Cross-Sectional Variation) 
According to the early view (Demsetz, 1968), market makers simply provide the service for 
immediacy. The competitive (realized) bid ask spread compensates for the cost of providing this 
service. According to this view the cross sectional variation can be captured by regressions of the 
form (Madhavan, 2000): 
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 is the inverse of the price as a proxy of the discreteness of price changes. The 
underlying riskiness of security i is measured by the volatility of past returns  i σ . Trading 
activity is measured by volume  i V .   Studies of modern (i.e. post-WWII) markets reveal that 
volume, risk, price and firm size explain most of the variability of bid-ask spreads. Volume tends 
to reduce spreads since dealers can turn around inventories more quickly, reducing inventory 
risk. Risk typically increases spreads.  
  Modern market microstructure theory adds to the early view of cost components 
based on privileged (or inside) information and dealers’ optimal inventory behavior. So, for a 
prominent example, Stoll (2003) delineates between two views—not mutually exclusive—of 
transactions costs as a reflection of a market maker’s processing costs and inventory risk (using 
real resources) and as compensation for a market maker’s losses to informed traders (not using 
real resources).  Theoretical models of inventory risk, such as Stoll (1978), find that the 
proportional spread is an increasing function of dealer’s risk aversion, the risk (i.e., variance) of 
the security being traded, and of the size of the transaction.  Theories of information asymmetry 
(e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985 and Kyle, 1985) indicate that the spread increases in the 
probability of encountering an informed trader as well as in the degree of uncertainty over asset 
value.    
  It is also worthwhile mentioning Dennert’s (1993) work on competing market makers 
under adverse selection.  While inside traders tend to camouflage their trades in each individual 
trade, they can exploit market fragmentation and submit trades almost simultaneously. Market 
makers will only realize the activity of insiders, when they find it difficult to sell off their 
position in the inter-dealer market. According to this model, volume increases when insiders are 
active. This increase correlates positively with the number of market makers in the security.   26
Hence, according to this theory, insiders will profit more from insider information in actively 
traded securities where relatively many market makers provide liquidity.  This model predicts 
that skewness of volume correlates with insider activity.
23 An increase in (positive) skewness of 
volume would suggest a reduction of insider trading activity, and hence a reduction in adverse 
selection costs, implying a negative correlation between skewness and spreads. 
  Since inventory holding costs and information affect price dynamics differently, the two 
components can be identified if sufficiently rich data are available. Inventory holding costs imply 
mean reversion since dealers constantly trade back to their desired inventory position. 
Information has permanent effects on security prices since it affects a security’s fundamental 
valuation. Glosten and Harris (1988) and Hasbrouck (1999) provide analyses of how the 
observed spreads can be decomposed into its components, when data are available on a high 
(intraday) frequency. 
  To summarize, the theoretical literature on transactions costs suggest that spreads vary in 
cross section, particularly with factors that indicate a stocks liquidity, risk, or information 
transparency.  For example, the following factors should relate to spreads: in the positive 
direction, variance of returns and lumpiness of trading; in the negative direction, stock price, 
number of trading days, total trading volume, and proxies for information availability (such as 
firm size or age), as well as skewness of volume.   
  Several empirical studies support these models.  In his survey of existing cross-sectional 
evidence, Stoll (2003) finds that fundamental values—share volume, return variance, price, 
number of trades and market value—nearly always relate very significantly to spreads in modern 
data.  Trading volume is particularly informative:  in both theory and practice, heavily traded 
stocks trade with lower costs.  These stocks benefit from economies of scale in order processing, 
                                                 
23  This prediction has largely been unexplored in empirical work so far. Madhavan, for example, does not refer at 
all to Dennert (1993). On the other hand, Dennert does not emphasize the empirical implications of his model.    27
significantly lower inventory holding costs and illiquidity risk to market makers, and possibly 
also from greater transparency of information regarding the underlying company and therefore 
lower asymmetric information costs.  To the extent that they tend to also have more outside 
shareholders, the likelihood of encountering an insider is also reduced.  If specialists retain 
market power even in high-volume stocks, however, we could anticipate little or no decline in 
the order processing component of the spread.     
  Table 6 sums up the testable implications of the various theories of factors 
influencing bid-ask spreads.  Certain empirical variables proxy for more than one theoretical 
relationship.  For example, trading volume and number of trading days provide an indication of 
the liquidity of a security’s market and may also proxy for information availability; they may 
also relate inversely to the probability of a market maker encountering an insider trade.  For 
some variables, such as trade size, individual transaction data are unavailable for the period of 
the study.  
 
Hypotheses on historical average spreads and components 
We set out several hypotheses based on the historical analysis.  First, at the narrow level of the 
individual specialist, there seem to have been opportunities to set transactions costs above 
competitive levels due to the market power exercised, at least in some shares.  At the broader 
level, the continuous market mechanism could have reinforced this tendency by splitting up 
orders into smaller lots (as opposed to aggregating the day’s trades into larger ones) and thereby 
keeping order processing costs high.  As communications technologies had advanced relatively 
far by 1900, order processing costs may have declined from their 19
th century levels.  Moreover, 
the NYSE maintained relatively tight listing standards, which should have mitigated asymmetric 
information costs.  Still, we expect that the cost increasing factors dominate, so that we should 
find that average total transactions costs (realized spreads) for the full population of stocks in   28
1900 and 1910 exceed those calculated for the post-WWII period, particularly the last few 
decades of the 20
th century.  We hypothesize further that these relatively high costs stem both 
from a high order processing component and a somewhat higher adverse selection component. 
  In terms of the cross sectional variation in spreads, we expect that the theoretical models 
apply in the earlier stages of market development as they have in recent years.  Thus, our 
hypotheses remain essentially the same as those posited in the literature. 
 
Cross-Sectional Relationships 
In this final section, we look at the cross-sectional determinants of bid-ask spreads and of the 
Amihud measure .  While there is no single structural model of trading costs, the various 
theoretical models of spreads lead to a number of testable predictions, many of which are 
summarized in Table 6.  We use the following variables to explain average percentage spreads: 
average daily dollar volume (V), average price (P), variance of stock returns (Var) and the 
number of trading days (Days).  This specification largely parallels Stoll (2000) and other studies 
surveyed by Madhavan (2000) and Stoll (2003), notably Demsetz (1968).  Additionally, we 
include the skewness of daily trading volume, in order to attempt to proxy (inversely) for the 
lumpiness of trading, an indicator that relates to the frequency of large trades and therefore the 
likelihood of the market maker dealing with an informed insider.   
For each year (1900 and 1910) and each stock type, common versus preferred, we run 
separate regressions based on monthly averages of our data.
24  Aggregating our data to a monthly 
frequency helps to eliminate the noise of daily data and still leaves a rich enough structure to 
allow for dynamic interactions between spread and liquidity measures and also the computation 
of return variance and volume skewness. Since transactions prices, volume and liquidity are 
                                                 
24 Recall that the data sources available do not quote bid and ask prices for 1890, so we cannot estimate the quoted 
spread model for that year.   29
theoretically jointly determined, we only consider predetermined variables as regressors in order 
to reduce the impact of simultaneity on our parameter estimates.
25  Moreover, we use median 
regression to deal with outlier problems that are prevalent in our data set (see Figure 2). 
As hypothesized, illiquidity relates positively with spreads, while trading volume (both 
measures) and the price level relate negatively with spreads (Table 7).  These cross-sectional 
relationships hold for both common and preferred stocks in both years.  Interestingly, the 
elasticity of spreads with respect to volume is the same for common and preferred stocks, about 
2% in 1900 declining to 1.1% in 1910. The elasticity of spreads with respect to the price level, 
however, is twice for preferred relative to common stocks in both years.  Less consistently, but in 
line with theory, risk has a positive impact on spreads.  Skewness of trading volume on the other 
hand does not seem to systematically drive spreads. 
Interestingly, we find a strong negative impact of cross-listing on the Consolidated 
Exchange, particularly for common stocks.
26 The cross-listing dummy measures the extent of the 
competitive pressure that the Consolidated Exchange exerted on New York Stock Exchange 
quoted spreads. This finding significantly strengthens the result of Brown et al. (forthcoming), 
who identify the competitive effect in the time domain around the emergence and the closure of 
the Consolidated Exchange. The evidence is less clear for preferred stocks; however, only few of 
those are dually traded. We also find that rail stocks tend to have tighter spreads.  Rail stocks are 
generally traded on both exchanges in larger volumes. Hence, we may be picking up an 
additional effect of the competitive cross market trading in high-volume shares.   
The determinants of illiquidity essentially are the same as those of quoted spreads. 
However, our results confirm that the Amihud measure aggregates those factors differently 
                                                 
25  We tested various cross-sectional regressions based on annual data and found ample evidence of simultaneity 
problems and parameter instability.  
26  Strictly speaking “cross-listing” really means trading on both exchanges, since the Consolidated Exchange did 
not have a formal listing procedure. In principle, any security could be traded there.   In 1900, preferred shares have 
a negative cross-listing effect, but in 1910, the effect is reversed.     30
relative to the quoted spread. Still, volume has a negative impact on illiquidity, while the spreads 
and the price level consistently exert a positive impact on illiquidity.  Rail companies have lower 
illiquidity only for their common stocks and only in 1900; otherwise the rail dummy is irrelevant 
for explaining illiquidity. Likewise the number of trading days only affects illiquidity of common 
stocks in 1900.  Skewness of volume has no discernible impact. 
The cross-listing dummy does not exert a systematic influence on liquidity. Statistically, 
it has a strong positive impact only in 1900 and a negative impact on preferred stocks in 1910. 
From a theoretical perspective two forces of dual trading are interacting in this case, leaving the 
aggregate effect unclear: dual trading tends to reduce liquidity in each market, while competition 
and lower trading costs tends to boost liquidity. In general, the net effect cannot be predicted 
without further information about market characteristics.  
Overall, the cross-sectional results on the illiquidity measure accord well with those on 
the quoted spread. However, explanatory power is significantly higher for the spread regressions. 
Moreover, these results on a key historical market fall very much in line with similar cross-
sectional analyses of established (e.g. Stoll, 2003) or emerging markets recently (Lesmond, 
2005).
27  In this sense, we argue that the behavior of traders, and therefore the drivers of price 
discovery and liquidity, are already discernable in this unregulated regime and are quite 
comparable to those in tightly regulated modern markets.  
 
VII. Conclusions  
 
This paper contributes in several ways to the newly emerging line of research into the 
microstructure and performance of securities markets in the unregulated era.  We provide the 
                                                 
27  Our cross-sectional parameter estimates correspond reasonably well with Lesmond’s (2005) estimates for modern 
emerging markets. While he can control for legal origin in his data set, in our historical analysis we can verify a 
strong negative influence of the quoted bid-ask spread.    31
first comprehensive daily measures of market illiquidity, quoted bid-ask spreads, and effective 
transactions costs for the pre-WWI NYSE; the last of which we decompose into order processing 
and asymmetric information components.  We also analyze changes in these measures over time 
as well as the cross-sectional determinants at each point in time.  
  Most interestingly, we find that trading costs and measures of illiquidity were roughly 
comparable with modern-day rates for the most heavily traded securities. This finding 
demonstrates that even prior to the introduction of regulatory oversight, early securities markets 
did perform remarkably well. Moreover, the decomposition of the quoted bid-ask spread into 
order-processing and an adverse selection components suggests that adverse selection is not a 
significant component of trading costs in the earlier periods. While order processing costs did not 
vary much from 1900 to 1910 in absolute terms, their relative role declined. Moreover, we find 
evidence that quoted spreads did react to competitive pressure from rival markets, such as the 
Consolidated Exchange. NYSE securities that did not trade on the Consolidated exhibit a 
substantially larger probability of price-clustering, an indicator of non-competitive conduct. It is 
likely that the competitive reaction for dually-traded securities is largely driven by the order-
processing component. On the other hand, fragmented trading should increase the adverse 
selection component. The analysis of the precise nature of competition between those early 
exchanges requires even more detailed data and, therefore, is left for future research.  
Of methodological importance, we find different patterns in the various measures of 
trading costs and market liquidity.  While we find that mean measures of market illiquidity, 
trading volume, and effective spreads all move together over time, quoted bid-ask spreads do 
not.  Thus, the first three measures may provide a more accurate picture of market functioning at 
the aggregate level than do the quoted spreads.   Cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of 
quoted spreads, however, indicate that this measures does help differentiate among individual 
stocks at a given point in time, reacting as expected to measures of trading volume, price, and   32
risk.  The measure also relates closely to illiquidity in cross section, and the determinants of the 
quoted spread are more robust. 
Our analysis of the performance of the early New York securities markets suggests little 
cause for the regulatory intervention at least by that time.  Based on our decomposition of quoted 
prices we find some evidence that informed trading was becoming a more serious component of 
trading costs from 1900 to 1910.  Further research (and much more data collection) is needed to 
examine the pre-regulatory era completely.  Our work suggests that market microstructure 
analysis based on historical cross-sectional trading data may prove useful to a scholarly analysis 
of the regulatory process that ultimately generated the various regulatory instruments such as 
insider trading restrictions and conduct regulation to ensure competitive pricing.  Of particular 
use would be analysis of specific crises that prompted arguments leading to the foundation of the 
SEC.   
   33
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Table 1:  Listings and Trading Activity on the New York Stock Exchange, 1890-1910 
 
   1890 1900 1910
Number of companies in NYT    231 190  200




































Number of companies with at 







































Notes:  In the first row, all issues for one company count as one company.    36
 
Table 2: The 20 Most Traded Stocks at the NYSE, 1890 - 1910 
 
Panel A: 1890     Volume traded ($)   
Name  No of obs.  Avg. volume ($)  Total volume ($)
Sugar Ref. Co  280 2,197,006 615,161,680
Del., Lack & Western  291 1,925,099 560,203,809
Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul  292 1,160,432 338,846,144
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific  292 772,939 225,698,276
Louis. & Nashville  292 752,132 219,622,427
Phil. & Reading  289 690,785 199,636,923
Union Pacific  292 651,819 190,331,206
Missouri Pacific  292 545,953 159,418,218
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe  292 524,884 153,266,216
Chicago, Bur. & Quincy  286 532,010 152,154,974
Northern Pacific pf.  288 437,604 126,029,981
Lake Shore  290 313,166 90,818,169
Chicago Gas Co.  179 435,223 77,904,828
C., C., C. & St. L.  288 230,523 66,390,653
Chicago & Northwestern  289 227,893 65,860,961
New York & New England  292 213,735 62,410,532
Oregon & Trans.  188 322,587 60,646,281
Western Union Telegraph  290 203,453 59,001,370
Chicago Gas Trust  112 417,904 46,805,214
Rich & W. P.e  292 144,878 42,304,376
        
Panel B: 1900     Volume traded ($)   
Name  No of obs.  Avg. volume ($)  Total volume ($) 
American Sugar Ref. Co.  287 5,563,141 1,596,621,467
Brooklyn Rapid Tran.  290 1,700,663 493,192,270
Pennsylvania R. R.  288 1,627,078 468,598,464
American Tobacco  286 1,532,739 438,363,354
Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul  289 1,474,464 426,120,096
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe pf.  290 1,416,788 410,868,520
Union Pacific  291 1,355,106 394,335,846
Chicago, Bur. & Quincy  288 1,307,724 376,624,512
People's Gas, Chicago  288 1,260,107 362,910,816
Northern Pacific  289 1,028,360 297,196,040
Manhattan Elevated  254 944,303 239,852,911
Missouri Pacific  291 761,490 221,593,706
Reading 1st pf.  289 715,263 206,711,007
Met. Street Railway  285 724,258 206,413,644
Baltimore & Ohio  290 700,158 203,045,878
Southern Pacific  291 662,550 192,801,934
American Steel & Wire  288 625,523 180,150,624
New York Central  286 544,807 155,814,688
Federal Steel  290 507,879 147,284,881
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific  287 495,239 142,133,593  37
        
Panel C: 1910     Volume traded ($)   
Name  No of obs. Avg. volumes ($)  Total volume ($) 
Reading 293 14,601,207 4,278,153,651
Union Pacific  291 11,544,421 3,359,426,511
U. S. Steel  292 10,447,567 3,050,689,564
Southern Pac.  292 2,827,583 825,654,236
Amalgamated Copper  291 2,002,704 582,786,864
Pennsylvania R. R.  292 1,782,215 520,406,780
American Smelt. & Ref  293 1,320,117 386,794,281
Chi., Mil. & St. Paul  292 1,224,725 357,619,700
Atch., Top. & S. F.  292 1,221,991 356,821,372
N. Y. Central  291 850,918 247,617,080
Chesapeake & Ohio  291 757,242 220,357,538
Consolidated Gas.  292 748,185 218,470,078
Northern Pacific  292 640,561 187,043,666
Rock Island Co  296 538,217 159,312,350
Brooklyn Rapid Tran  292 463,473 135,334,174
Great Northern pf.  289 447,186 129,236,667
Canadian Pacific  283 382,367 108,209,804
Lehigh Valley  27 3,897,035 105,219,945
Interborough-Met. pf.  293 297,480 87,161,523
American Tel. & Tel.  293 260,048 76,194,181
   38
Table 3 (a): Effective Spreads and Liquidity in 1890 
 











Preferred stocks:        
 All    Mean  16339 130 58.98 0.038 10.77  2.18
     Median  8566 108 58.48 0.031 3.20  1.98
     Std.  Dev.  30776 78 31.57 0.030 23.89  4.24
     Obs.  41 41 41 41 41  41
            
 Low    Mean  2821 70 25.35 0.049 32.90  1.47
     Median  2625 56 25.63 0.048 10.53  2.83
     Std.  Dev.  1200 37 11.32 0.020 45.09  5.48
     O b s .   99999   9
            
 Medium   Mean  9034 116 68.32 0.042 6.28  2.83
     Median  8283 106 64.38 0.032 3.41  1.75
     Std.  Dev.  3153 55 30.21 0.036 5.74  4.61
     Obs.  22 22 22 22 22  22
            
 High    Mean  44575 216 68.72 0.019 0.73  1.41
     Median  25598 235 74.46 0.019 0.67  1.55
     Std.  Dev.  54645 82 27.14 0.011 0.46  1.26
     Obs.  10 10 10 10 10  10
            
Common stocks:       
 All    Mean  88178 165 53.79 0.054 19.79  4.38
     Median  10300 162 35.27 0.032 2.85  1.81
     Std.  Dev.  243801 91 46.52 0.179 57.47  22.47
     Obs.  116 116 116 116 116  116
            
 Low    Mean  2928 98 33.18 0.099 50.01  8.13
     Median  3050 88 19.01 0.045 15.36  1.93
     Std.  Dev.  1420 52 41.08 0.289 86.82  36.70
     Obs.  43 43 43 43 43  43
            
 Medium   Mean  10894 149 56.16 0.030 4.12  2.13
     Median  10300 148 31.59 0.031 3.01  1.94
     Std.  Dev.  3803 82 51.34 0.018 4.60  3.03
     Obs.  30 30 30 30 30  30
            
 High    Mean  227348 245 72.74 0.026 0.49  2.20
     Median  68595 280 70.17 0.020 0.27  1.46
     Std.  Dev.  362217 64 40.16 0.020 0.68  2.61
     Obs.  43 43 43 43 43  43  39
 
Table 3 (b): Quoted and Effective Spreads and Liquidity in 1900








St. dev. of 
returns 
Avg. 
spread GKN   Amihud  GKN2  (%) 
Preferred stocks:            
 All    Mean  44814 168 69.55 0.021  0.018 0.018 2.23 0.94
     Median  13350 178 70.44 0.015  0.015 0.015 1.19 0.84
     Std.  Dev.  131365 86 31.43 0.036  0.012 0.016 3.70 1.27
     Obs.  74 74 74 74  74 74 74 72
               
 Low    Mean  6440 103 53.49 0.022  0.032 0.020 4.92 1.02
     Median  6900 94 49.38 0.021  0.034 0.021 3.39 1.54
     Std.  Dev.  1853 46 31.26 0.009  0.011 0.010 4.60 1.66
     Obs.  17 17 17 17  17 17 17 17
      
 Medium    Mean  15023 157 73.49 0.025  0.018 0.017 1.93 1.08
     Median  13200 164 75.26 0.017  0.015 0.015 1.22 0.86
     Std.  Dev.  4619 79 32.35 0.049  0.007 0.011 3.51 1.30
     Obs.  39 39 39 39  39 39 39 37
               
 High    Mean  145601 256 76.17 0.011  0.006 0.017 0.35 0.60
     Median  64905 273 73.07 0.011  0.006 0.009 0.26 0.68
     Std.  Dev.  244514 56 25.37 0.004  0.003 0.027 0.32 0.61
     Obs.  18 18 18 18  18 18 18 18
               
Common stocks:            
 All    Mean  152544 188 55.40 0.027  0.028 0.026 10.08 1.09
     Median  13000 211 36.55 0.022  0.017 0.019 1.60 0.95
     Std.  Dev.  460846 92 48.20 0.019  0.029 0.022 33.07 2.18
     Obs.  129 129 129 129  129 129 129 125  40
               
 Low    Mean  4292 128 26.22 0.040  0.052 0.039 23.86 2.05
     Median  3474 117 15.72 0.034  0.043 0.031 7.25 2.23
     Std.  Dev.  2529 72 29.62 0.023  0.032 0.024 49.76 2.97
     Obs.  51 51 51 51  51 51 51 48
               
 Medium    Mean  14806 189 57.10 0.021  0.019 0.023 2.32 0.76
     Median  13668 220 46.08 0.018  0.017 0.021 1.60 0.86
     Std.  Dev.  4726 84 44.77 0.010  0.010 0.014 2.07 1.25
     Obs.  29 29 29 29  29 29 29 28
               
 High    Mean  388365 250 84.76 0.017  0.007 0.013 0.34 0.35
     Median  142643 285 78.27 0.015  0.006 0.009 0.13 0.51
     Std.  Dev.  689013 72 48.23 0.009  0.005 0.015 0.50 1.12
     Obs.  49 49 49 49  49 49 49 49
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Table 3 (c): Quoted and Effective Spreads and Liquidity in 1910












measure Amihud GKN2  (%) 
Preferred stocks:            
 All    Mean  24427 144 75.77 0.021  0.030 0.031 2.45 0.54
     Median  11940 134 75.56 0.014  0.017 0.016 0.75 0.78
     Std.  Dev.  45570 78 32.21 0.022  0.033 0.033 6.57 2.02
     Obs.  68 68 68 68  68 68 68 68
               
 Low    Mean  7198 89 64.23 0.029  0.049 0.038 5.02 0.70
     Median  7298 88 68.42 0.016  0.035 0.034 1.67 1.06
     Std.  Dev.  2403 47 28.56 0.031  0.043 0.030 9.75 2.50
     Obs.  28 28 28 28  28 28 28 28
               
 Medium    Mean  15684 158 81.18 0.016  0.020 0.029 0.83 0.37
     Median  12900 155 75.29 0.014  0.016 0.015 0.61 0.89
     Std.  Dev.  4346 61 31.89 0.010  0.014 0.040 0.64 1.94
     Obs.  27 27 27 27  27 27 27 27
               
 High    Mean  79694 234 89.39 0.013  0.008 0.018 0.30 0.58
     Median  33125 253 95.68 0.009  0.008 0.015 0.24 0.45
     Std.  Dev.  85831 67 34.31 0.007  0.003 0.015 0.21 0.64
     Obs.  13 13 13 13  13 13 13 13
               
Common stocks:            
 All    Mean  332468 191 70.28 0.026  0.030 0.030 5.02 0.98
     Median  18172 209 58.37 0.020  0.017 0.021 0.80 0.80
     Std.  Dev.  1560956 83 52.11 0.024  0.041 0.029 13.92 2.49
     Obs.  114 114 114 114  114 114 114 114
                 42
 Low    Mean  4795 136 26.59 0.049  0.070 0.053 16.17 2.02
     Median  4156 128 20.78 0.039  0.054 0.048 8.03 2.48
     Std.  Dev.  3132 68 22.36 0.033  0.060 0.034 22.94 4.31
     Obs.  32 32 32 32  32 32 32 32
               
 Medium    Mean  15805 167 73.85 0.021  0.024 0.027 1.16 0.60
     Median  15175 175 63.84 0.022  0.020 0.020 1.01 1.06
     Std.  Dev.  3854 71 52.84 0.007  0.013 0.026 0.66 1.27
     Obs.  34 34 34 34  34 34 34 34
               
 High    Mean  775221 245 96.87 0.014  0.008 0.018 0.31 0.56
     Median  63328 272 100.99 0.012  0.008 0.012 0.15 0.53
     Std.  Dev.  2347831 67 46.98 0.006  0.004 0.016 0.57 0.71
     Obs.  48 48 48 48  48 48 48 48  43
Table 4: Spread Decomposition Regression and the Implied Components 
 





























Common  1900  0.0116  0.5080  0.44  129  2.76 1.40  1.36 0.87 0.44  0.43 
 (5.96)***  (7.55)***                
High  0.0064  0.9884  0.18  64  0.92 0.90  0.01 0.60 0.59  0.01 
 (2.40)**  (4.84)***                
Low  0.0145  0.4605  0.38  65  4.57 2.10  2.46 1.14 0.53  0.62 
 (3.97)***  (5.48)***                
Common  1910  0.0210  0.3073  0.19  114  3.00 0.92  2.08 1.33 0.41  0.92 
 (4.26)***  (1.62)                 
High  0.0169  0.2086  0.01  57  0.99 0.21  0.79 1.04 0.22  0.82 
 (4.54)***  (0.79)                 
Low  0.0300  0.2288  0.13  57  5.01 1.15  3.87 1.63 0.37  1.26 
 (5.27)***  (2.84)***                
Preferred  1900  0.0127  0.2896  0.04  74  1.82 0.53  1.30 1.14 0.33  0.81 
 (3.40)***  (1.92)*                 
High  0.0101  0.5873  0.03  37  1.06 0.62  0.44 0.67 0.39  0.28 
 (2.09)**  (2.22)**                 
Low  0.0127  0.2679  0.06  37  2.59 0.69  1.89 1.61 0.43  1.18 
 (2.80)***  (1.48)                 
Preferred  1910  0.0182  0.4204  0.18  68  2.96 1.24  1.71 1.76 0.74  1.02 
 (3.84)***  (5.09)***                
High 0.0260  -0.2442  0.01  34  1.40  0  1.75  1.20  0  1.20 
 (2.93)***  (-0.47)                 
Low  0.0192  0.4322  0.26  34  4.51 1.95  2.56 2.33 1.01  1.32 
 (2.45)**  (3.33)***                  44
Table 5: Price Discreteness Regressions 
  Dependent variable is the proportion of quotes that are multiples of one half. 
          
  Variable  Coefficient Std. Error*  t-Statistic  Prob.   
1900  Intercept  1.1626 0.0725 16.0253 0
  log(V)  -0.1086 0.0071 -15.2068 0
  Preferred  -0.0136 0.0169 -0.8076 0.4203
  log(Days)  -0.0433 0.0123 -3.5296 0.0005
  log(P)  0.2107 0.0119 17.6949 0
  Var  0.5653 0.5021 1.1259 0.2616
  Dummy(Consolidated)  -0.0878 0.0275 -3.1854 0.0017
  Dummy(Consolidated)*Var 62.7739 22.4289 2.7988 0.0056
          
 R-squared  0.7902 Observations:    203
          
  Variable  Coefficient Std. Error*  t-Statistic  Prob.   
1910  Intercept 1.2397 0.0946 13.1022 0
  log(V)  -0.0988 0.0099 -9.9885 0
  Preferred -0.0196 0.0160 -1.2281 0.2211
  log(Days) -0.0543 0.0138 -3.9422 0.0001
  log(P)  0.1797 0.0167 10.8057 0
  Var  4.6245 1.8659 2.4784 0.0141
  Dummy(Consolidated)  -0.0709 0.0288 -2.4646 0.0147
  Dummy(Consolidated)*Var 35.8994 17.3608 2.0678 0.0401
          
 R-squared  0.7812 Observations:    182
          
 *White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance  
Table 6 
 
Factors increasing spread   Available proxy variable  Expected relationship 
to spread 
Fundamental risk of security 
returns 




Preferred shares  Negative 
Transaction size (inventory 
holding) 
Daily or monthly volume/days 
traded (lumpiness) 
Positive 
Skewness of volume  Negative  
Illiquidity of market  Trading volume, stock price  Negative 
Probability of informed trade 
 
Number of trading days, total 
trading volume  
Negative 
Transaction size (lumpiness)  Positive 
Skewness of volume  Negative 
Lack of fundamental 
information availability 
Firm size, age, information 
availability, preferred shares 
Negative 
Market power of specialists  Price discreteness  Positive  
 
  
Table 7: Determinants of Average Spreads and the Amihud Liquidity Measure 
This table presents the results of a least absolute deviations (LAD) estimation. All continuous variables are monthly averages. 
Dummy(Rail) equals 1 if the issuing firm was a rail company and zero otherwise. Dummy(Consolidated) equals 1 if more than 100 
shares traded on the Consolidated on at least one of 12 randomly selected days and zero otherwise. The estimation corrects for 
heteroskedasticity in the error structure using the Huber sandwich standard errors and covariances. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
  Spread 1900  Spread 1910  Amihud 1900  Amihud 1910 
Indep. Variables  Common  Preferred  Common  Preferred  Common  Preferred  Common  Preferred 
C  0.099 0.101  0.108  0.122  1.203  7.402 3.811  7.355 
 (25.71)***  (15.65)*** (14.96)***  (13.52)***  (1.06)  (6.61)***  (3.64)***  (4.06)*** 
log( ) t V   -0.002 -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.227  -0.368 -0.024  -0.310 
 (-8.83)***  (-5.65)***  (-3.46)***  (-2.45)**  (-2.40)**  (-7.30)***  (-0.58)  (-5.40)*** 
1 log( ) t P−   -0.004 -0.008  -0.007  -0.011  -0.181  -0.661 -0.783  -0.958 
 (-9.68)***  (-8.88)***  (-7.67)***  (-6.56)***  (-0.939)  (-3.89)***  (-6.26)***  (-2.55)** 
1 t Var−   2.020 -0.139  0.520  3.985  316.322  106.138  429.648  128.597 
 (2.20)**  (-0.87)  (10.80)***  (2.27)** (0.31)  (0.53)  (2.84)***  (0.24) 
2
1 t Var−   30.030 -0.058  -2.381  -320.562  -16031.23  1371.222  -1304.186  -71.045 
 (0.86)  (-0.12)  (-15.55)***  (-3.65)***  (-0.14)  (0.21)  (-2.50)**  (-0.24) 
log( ) t Days   -0.016 -0.012  -0.019  -0.014  0.501 -0.059 -0.013  0.098 
 (-15.07)***  (-7.73)***  (-8.86)***  (-9.00)***  (2.03)**  (-0.47)  (-0.07)  (0.83) 
Dummy(Rail)  -0.001 -0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.222 0.014  0.066 -0.073 
 (-2.93)***  (-3.05)***  (1.55)  (-1.64)  (2.11)**  (0.20)  (1.14)  (-1.01) 
1 t Amihud −   0.0004 0.0004  0.0011  0.0008         
 (5.74)***  (3.13)***  (8.10)***  (16.79)***         
1 t Spread −          102.539  17.562  46.082  23.658 
         (4.64)***  (5.38)***  (2.89)***  (10.66)*** 
Skewness of  1 t Sales −   -0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.043  -0.021 -0.034  -0.007 
 (-3.31)***  (-0.65)  (-0.35)  (0.16)  (-0.56)  (-0.38)  (-0.75)  (-0.15) 
Dummy(Consolidated)  -0.0017 -0.002 -0.002  0.002  0.437  0.083  -0.185 0.069 
 (-3.02)***  (-2.73)***  (-3.38)***  (1.63)  (3.25)***  (0.75)  (-2.10)**  (0.69) 
No. of Observations  1215  725  1298  707  1148  691  1219  622 
Pseudo R-squared  0.444  0.365  0.401  0.327  0.149  0.157  0.155  0.153 
Adjusted R-squared  0.439  0.357  0.397  0.318  0.143  0.146  0.150  0.140  
 












Figure 2: Boxplot graphs of the cross-section of monthly average spreads. The box contains the middle 
50% of the data. The vertical line inside the box is the median and the black dot is the average. The 
shaded area gives the 95% confidence interval for the median. The whiskers show the highest or lowest 
value unless there are outliers in which case they extend up or down to 1.5 times the height of the box. 
Diamonds and stars denote near and far outliers, respectively. The graphs are cut off at 0.15. 
 
(a): Monthly average spreads of common stocks in 1900: 
 
(b): Monthly average spreads of preferred stocks in 1900:  
(c): Monthly average spreads of common stocks in 1910: 
 
 
(d): Monthly average spreads of preferred stocks in 1910: 
 